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ABSTRACT 
Structuring the early design phase of automotive systems is an important part of efficient and successful 
development processes. Today, safety considerations (e.g., the safety life cycle of ISO 26262) 
significantly affect the course of development. Preliminary designs are expressed in functional system 
architectures, which are required to form safety concepts. Thus, mapping tasks and work products to a 
reference process during early design stages is an important part of structuring the system development. 
This contribution describes the systematic creation and notation of the functional safety concept within 
the concept phase of development of an unmanned protective vehicle within the research project aFAS. 
Different stages of preliminary design and dependencies between them are displayed by the work 
products created and used. The full set of functional safety requirements and an excerpt of the safety 
argument structure of the SAE level 4 application are presented. 
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The design of automated driving functions and driverless cars significantly increases the already high
complexity of development activities for vehicle electronics. Additional requirements have to be consid-
ered for a systematic design of driverless systems, especially to incorporate several safety aspects when
human drivers are not present as fallback for shortcomings of the technical system. Thus, safety consid-
erations have significant impact on the outcome of design processes for automated driving functions, as
the argument of safety on a vehicle level is a major concern during preliminary development.
In compliance with the standard ISO 26262 (International Organization for Standardization, 2016), the
formation of a safety concept has to be divided into two individual parts, addressing different levels
of abstraction, the functional safety concept and the technical safety concept. During functional safety
conceptualization, functional safety requirements are derived from top-level safety goals of the system
under development. Safety goals are generated as part of the work product of the hazard analysis and risk
assessment task of ISO 26262, which also includes an assignment of automotive safety integrity levels
(ASIL) to each goal that result from a risk classification. The functional safety concept is intended to
describe safety strategies in order to achieve the safety goals. During the later steps of system design, the
technical safety concept is defined; it outlines implementations of the functional concept and considers
specific technology decisions or performance assumptions.
As presented in a previous work (Graubohm et al., 2017), the early design phase of automated driv-
ing functions can be described through an iterative reference process, depicted in Figure 1b. The
process defines two loops, i.e. a flexible inner loop representing the concept phase of development
and an outer loop containing implementation and testing steps. In addition to generic milestones of
advanced development, stages of the functional safety life cycle of ISO 26262 can be mapped to design
phases without representing a strict sequence of individual process steps. Evidently, the process steps
are performed simultaneously and iteratively especially as automotive systems design faces challenges
of interdisciplinary development that can even be split between teams or companies.
Iterations of the functional concept, described by the inner loop, are the focus of this paper. Interdepen-
dent stages that can be distinguished during this concept phase are: the item definition, which specifies
the system functionality, the hazard analysis and risk assessment, and the functional safety concept gen-
eration. A comprehensive and consistent functional safety concept is a prerequisite in order to develop
system requirements and proceed into the technical design phase.
Due to its importance in the development process, the functional safety concept, describing risk mit-
igation strategies for identified hazards, is one of the main objectives within the concept phase. This
contribution presents findings from the research project aFAS about safety concept generation and nota-
tion. Additionally, a systematic process structure for determining a sound set of safety requirements
within the process of preliminary design of automated driving functions is discussed.
First, the project context and previous works are presented in the next section. Subsequently, Section 3
introduces related work on functional safety concept generation for vehicle systems. Lastly, the process
of safety concept generation in the context of the research project aFAS is discussed in Section 4.
2 PROJECT CONTEXT
The goal of the successfully completed project aFAS was the development of a system for the unmanned
operation of a protective vehicle on the hard shoulder of highways in Germany. The system allows for
driverless low speed operation on hard shoulders only, following a leading vehicle within a defined
distance. Stolte et al. (2015) describe the project concept in detail. The authors illustrate the system’s
intended functionality and present an early functional system architecture.
Additional contributions illustrate the process of the preliminary design while pursuing safety con-
ceptualization; for example, Bagschik et al. (2016) describe a method to systematically identify system
hazards for automated vehicles as demanded by ISO 26262 in the context of the hazard analysis and risk
assessment (HARA). The authors evaluate their results in (Bagschik et al., 2017) by applying Systems-
Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) to the vehicle concept. Subsequently, Stolte et al. (2017) introduce
an approach to structure the HARA task of development of an automated driving function used in the
aFAS project. The dependencies between identified individual process steps during the HARA task have
been incorporated in the reference development process presented by Graubohm et al. (2017).
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3 RELATED WORK
This contribution investigates a structured approach for generating and documenting functional safety
concepts on the basis of systematically derived abstract safety goals on a vehicle level. The externally
visible behavior of the unmanned protective vehicle in the context of the safety conceptualization has
first been examined by Bagschik et al. (2016). With regard to the definition used by Waymo (2017), the
safety aspect directly addressed is the behavioral safety of the system under development. Within the
early design phase, a top-down development of automated vehicles will likely focus on such safety goals
describing external vehicle behavior. However, other safety aspects that will be addressed during system
design specification, especially functional safety mechanisms, are included in the abstract considera-
tion of vehicle behavior. Therefore, multiple standards, managing safety concerns within automotive
development, can be simultaneously adopted, especially ISO 26262 and the upcoming ISO PAS 21448
“Safety of the intended functionality” (International Organization for Standardization, 2018).
Feth et al. (2018) discuss the current standard coverage defining safe behavior of automated vehicles
focusing on behavioral planning functions. The authors argue that safe nominal behavior specification of
level 3+ systems (SAE International, 2018) is currently not covered by standards and standard creation
initiatives. They propose a multi-aspect safety engineering process, which defines different abstraction
layers that influence a joint safety argument. Their approach determines sensor and algorithmic concepts
before generating the functional safety concept and, thus, does not generate work products of the concept
phase independent of technical implementation considerations, as performed in the aFAS project.
Johansson et al. (2017) discuss the iterative character of the concept phase comprising the work products
of ISO 26262 in the context of the research project FUSE. The authors propose the need for addi-
tional steps and formal refinement verification when deriving safety requirements from safety goals.
Abdulkhaleq et al. (2017) present an approach of using stages inferred from Systems-Theoretic Process
Analysis after the definition of safety goals and before the specification of safety requirements. Nolte
et al. (2017) discuss an approach for structuring the conceptualization of self-aware automated road
vehicles based on investigations of skills and abilities. Based on the example of the aFAS project, it is
illustrated how safety requirements can be systematically deduced from safety goals with the help of
representations of the behavioral skills of the system under development.
Stolte et al. (2016) discuss functional safety mechanisms for actuation systems of automated vehicles
as the basis of systematically deriving safety requirements and linking them with safety goals in the
context of the aFAS project. As a series heavy commercial vehicle was used as the basis for the devel-
oped prototype, the systems theory-based approach presented uses concrete safety goals for functional
components of the actuation system relying on extensive assumptions about the system structure.
Several papers examine the safety concept design for driver assistance systems and automated vehicles
with regard to functional strategies and effects on the functional architecture of the system under devel-
opment, e.g., Hörwick and Siedersberger (2010); Binfet-Kull et al. (1998); Reschka (2016); Kocsis
et al. (2017). These contributions commonly develop functional safety requirements; however, they do
not comprise the results of the hazard analysis task. Nilsson et al. (2013) demonstrate the results of the
process steps during concept phase of ISO 26262 for a vehicle platooning system. Safety requirements
are directly derived from safety goals and allocated to a preliminary functional architecture. The authors,
however, do not indicate a structured approach for deriving and documenting the safety requirements.
The safety concept generation for vehicle subsystems in the context of ISO 26262 has been performed
and presented in the context of multiple projects and industrial case studies; for example, Becker et al.
(2017) discuss safety strategies and mechanisms in reaction to a specific ASIL-C-classified safety goal
for a traffic jam pilot. The authors develop requirements for the electric power supply and communica-
tion system of safety-critical components and propose a technical architectural solution. Sexton et al.
(2014) apply safety analysis techniques on a shift-by-wire system to derive requirements from potential
safety goal violations. Krithivasan et al. (2015) systematically develop functional safety requirements
from a set of safety goals for an electronic throttle controller using a process-modelling concept. Habli
et al. (2010) describe the model-based design of a safety argument for an air suspension system compris-
ing the functional safety concept. The safety concept notation used by the authors matches the approach
used in the aFAS project (cf. Section 4.1). In contrast, some approaches use UML-based diagrams for
development and documentation of safety requirements, e.g., Gillen et al. (2014); Beckers et al. (2014);
Antonino and Trapp (2014).
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It can be concluded that few of the published functional safety concepts deduce safety requirements
based on the abstract description of desired vehicle behavior, as it was performed within the aFAS
project. Additionally, a systematic process outline for safety requirement deduction and traceable doc-
umentation for a SAE level 3+ system is presented in this paper. The created functional safety concept
of the unmanned protective vehicle is discussed in Section 4.2.
4 FUNCTIONAL SAFETY CONCEPT GENERATION
A process structure can be inferred from the experiences regarding functional safety concept generation
in the research project aFAS. The safety requirement analysis depends on information of prior work
products of the concept phase of ISO 26262. Key inputs of the design process are depicted in Figure 1a.
Data generated and used within the item definition and HARA task is itemized and connected with sub-
sequent steps using arrows. As discussed earlier, the functional safety concept is an important objective































(b) Structure of the Design Model
(Graubohm et al., 2017)
Figure 1. Functional safety concept design within the concept phase of development
Based on our observations in the research project, the item definition of ISO 26262 is a living doc-
ument during the preliminary design stage. While the HARA task can be performed using an early
item definition, lacking major concept design information, the safety concept generation requires com-
prehensive information on architectural assumptions. Furthermore, a consistent set of safety goals has
to be available before a safety concept can be created, as safety concepts break down safety goals into
requirements. Iterations in the form of item refinements, describing the adaptations of the item definition
in response to design conflicts identified during the HARA task, have been described in previous work
(Stolte et al., 2017; Graubohm et al., 2017).
The fundamental difference between safety goal definition and functional safety concept generation is
the condition that safety requirements have to allow implementation. While safety goals are formulated
abstractly, directly addressing the hazards identified, functional safety requirements are formed with
respect to a preliminary functional system architecture, assigning formal requirements to functional
elements of the system under development. Hence, the functional safety concept is the link between the
functional concept and the technical design.
Mitigation strategies are deployed for breaking down safety goals into requirements. These strategies
integrate information stemming from the item definition, i.e. system abilities and planned safety mech-
anisms strongly influence the outcome of safety requirement deduction. In order to document applied
strategies and improve traceability within the work products of the concept phase, a graphical notation
can be used, as discussed in the following section (cf. 4.1).
Each safety goal is broken down into one or many safety requirements, while one individual safety
requirement can also realize multiple safety goals. The safety requirements and architectural ele-
ments assigned inherit the highest ASIL from the linked safety goals, unless the ASIL is decomposed,
ICED192866
reflecting that safety measures are split into redundant safety requirements, allocated to independent
architectural elements.
4.1 Functional safety concept notation
The functional safety requirements deduced during safety concept creation are often presented in tabular
form. This allows for easy documentation and adaptation of individual requirements. However, the
traceability of considerations and decisions within the safety conceptualization is limited and changes
likely result in inconsistencies. Using semi-formal notations to record functional safety concepts in
graphical form enables illustration and documentation of links between safety goals, requirements, and
applied strategies. Graphical safety argument structures also improve readability and avoid ambiguity.
The graphical representation applies argumentation structures typically used within safety cases. Thus,
using graphical notations during safety concept creation generates preliminary safety arguments that
can be extended and reassessed during the course of development. Eventually, the results of validation
and verification activities can be included as evidence in the graphical safety argument (Bishop and
Bloomfield, 1998; Kelly, 1998).
In the aFAS project, we used the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) (SCSC Assurance Case Work-
ing Group, 2018) for graphical safety concept documentation. The basic elements defined within the
semi-formal notation standard are shown in Figure 2. In general, statements are represented through
rectangles and evidence is represented through circles in GSN. Solid arrows mark links in the context of
an argument structure, in which strategies in the form of a parallelogram can also be included. Context
information, assumptions, and justifications are represented through elliptical shapes and connected to
































Figure 2. Elements of the goal structuring notation (SCSC Assurance Case Working Group, 2018)
The pattern of safety arguments in GSN focusses on breaking down top-level goals into multiple sub-
goals. Hence, in the context of a functional safety concept, the notation can be used for breaking down
safety goals into safety requirements. In later stages of development, the notation can also be employed
for linking technical requirements with functional requirements.
4.2 Functional safety concept of the aFAS project
As discussed above, the results of the HARA task of the system under development are a required input
of the functional safety concept generation. The hazard analysis process centrally relies on the definition
of operating modes and target behavior within the item definition. The operating modes specified in the
aFAS vehicle guidance system are shown in Figure 3a.
Process and results of the HARA for the operation of an unmanned protective vehicle without human
supervision are presented by Stolte et al. (2017). The safety goals and the classification assigned are
listed in Table 1. As the hazard analysis was performed in the context of the vehicle guidance system,
the majority of safety goals defined is only applicable during specific operating modes.
Additional required input from the context of the item definition was presented in other previous con-
tributions. Illustrating the systematic deduction of safety requirements from safety goals, Nolte et al.
(2017) provide an example of the graphical system ability representation. These skill graphs are used
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Figure 3. Modes of operation and functional components of the aFAS system
Table 1. Safety goals and ASIL classification in aFAS project following Stolte et al. (2017)
ID Safety Goal ASIL
SG01 Unintended and not permitted operating mode change must be prevented B
SG02 Intended and permitted operating mode change to Safe Halt must be ensured B
SG03 Steering actuation beyond specification must be prevented D
SG04 Unintended anti-lock brake actuation must be prevented C
SG05 Unintended acceleration must be prevented QM
SG06 Detection of driver intervention must be ensured QM
SG07 Display of actual operating mode in HMI must be ensured B
SG08 Unintended vehicle movement must be prevented B
SG09 Deceleration to standstill must be ensured B
SG10 Leaving tolerance ranges must trigger operating mode change to Safe Halt QM
SG11 Maximum vehicle speed specified must not be exceeded B
SG12 Overrunning hard shoulder markings must be prevented B
SG13 Detection of and reaction to (deceleration to standstill) relevant obstacles must be ensured QM
SG14 Identification of leading vehicle must be ensured QM
SG15 Detection of missing leading vehicle and operating mode change to Safe Halt must be ensured QM
SG16 Anti-lock functionality must be ensured D
SG17 Unintended steering actuation must be prevented D
to break down the external behavior into functional categories as an input for deriving strategies to
obtain and assign functional safety requirements. Skill graphs represent a system architecture within a
capability viewpoint (Bagschik et al., 2018). Thus, the functional system architecture as an alternative
viewpoint on the system shares the same functional components. A thorough introduction to the func-
tional system architecture, including the information flow between components, can be found in Stolte
et al. (2015). Components considered during safety concept creation are depicted in Figure 3b.
The functional components addressed to fulfill all safety goals are split between the protective vehi-
cle and the leading vehicle, which are connected through a radio link. Requirements are derived for
human-machine interfaces in both vehicles and the wireless connection. Additionally, the human oper-
ator manually driving the protective vehicle to the job site and changing into the leading vehicle is
included in the safety concept. The components of the protective vehicle include the actuator subsystems
as well as HMI, control logic, and environment perception of the vehicle guidance system.
Characteristical safety goals within the aFAS project result from the target behavior of the automated
protective vehicle to maintain a safe distance to the left lane marking at all times. Hazards of high
severity and low controllability result from potentially entering the adjacent traffic lane, in which flowing
traffic with high differential speed is expected. Thus, Safety Goal 3, which is used to argue the ASIL level
of Safety Goal 12, is a key element of the safety concept. Figure 4 shows the excerpt of the functional
safety concept addressing Safety Goal 3, it serves as an example for split argument structures. Different
strategies were identified to prevent steering actuation beyond specification. Requirements can result




Steering actuation beyond 
specification must be 
prevented
Relevant Hazards
Haz35 (ASIL D), Haz52 (ASIL D)
Relevant Operating Modes
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Functional Safety Req. 6
The system shall bring 
the vehicle to standstill 
on requests of other 
controllers
Functional Safety Req. 15
The controller shall 
request a brake to 
standstill on receiving a 
steering request outside 
of the valid range 
Specify a valid steering angle range during 
automated operation and brake to standstill 
on invalid steering requests
Component
Steering
Ensure safe actuation of the steering system 
by monitoring operational state and brake to 
standstill on faults
Functional Safety Req. 14
The system shall limit 
steering angle and 






Functional Safety Req. 16
The system shall realize 




Functional Safety Req. 63
The controller shall request a 
brake to standstill if plausibility 
checks on target and actual 
values to monitor control 
accuracy find discrepancies 
beyond the tolerance specified
Component
Steering
Functional Safety Req. 64
The controller shall send  
status messages including 
an alive-counter 
periodically to the Brake
Component
Steering
Functional Safety Req. 65
The system shall bring the 
vehicle to standstill on 
false or missing status 
messages of the Steering
Component
Brake
The unmanned vehicle operates
on the hard shoulder; stopping does 
not present a hazard
J
Following traffic is able to
recognize slow drifts into the driving 
lane and react appropriately
A
Figure 4. Excerpt of the functional safety concept addressing safety goal 3
The graphical structure allows for linking various information of the HARA results to the safety goal.
Functional safety requirements are connected to the safety goal through a strategy node, forming an
argument structure also including assumptions and justifications. In the context of the GSN standard,
functional safety requirements during the concept phase of development might also be represented
through undeveloped goal identifiers (cf. Figure 2), imparting that evidence is not yet linked to the
statements made (Kelly et al., 1997).
Also in cases of safety goals being applicable in both, manual and automated operation, different paths
within the argument structure were developed. An example is Safety Goal 1, aiming to prevent unin-
tended and not permitted operating mode changes. During manual operation, the hazards are mitigated
by using a main switch as part of the HMI in the protective vehicle to disconnect the vehicle guidance
system from any power supply. The switch is secured against accidental switch-on and the strategy jus-
tified by required safety training of the human operator. In contrast, during the automated operation, the
main switch cannot be part of the strategy to prevent false mode changes. Thus, a permanent monitoring
of system states within the central controller logic was designed.
A detailed listing of all functional safety requirements, the assigned components and the highest
associated ASIL classification can be found in the Appendix.
5 CONCLUSION
The systematic process structure for determining safety requirements in the concept phase of devel-
opment was discussed in this contribution. Additionally, findings about safety concept generation and
notation from the research project aFAS were presented, including an excerpt of the safety argument
structure and the full set of safety requirements of the SAE level 4 application. The graphical form
used for the documentation improves tractability of requirements and readability of argument struc-
tures; however, the semi-formal notation does not guarantee the validity of the safety argument. As
GSN elements contain free-text statements, a thorough validation of the functional safety concept has
to be performed before proceeding with further steps of system design.
The safety concept presented has proven itself in practice during the development of the protective
vehicle guidance system, demonstrated in public traffic at the end of the project. In the future, the
discussion of a structured extension of the safety arguments towards automotive safety cases will be
continued. Lastly, novel insights will be obtained in the safety concept generation for driverless vehicles
for inner-city traffic in the research project UNICARagil (cf. Woopen et al., 2018). The applicability of
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the presented approach will be evaluated in the context of the different operational design domain and
larger number of functional components.
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APPENDIX
Table A1 displays the functional safety requirements developed in the project aFAS. Several IDs were
discarded while the ID numbering was not adjusted, in order to preserve traceability between different
functional safety concept versions. Safety goals are referenced using the IDs introduced in Table 1.
Table A1. Functional safety requirements of the aFAS project
ID Component Functional Safety Requirement ASIL Safety Goal




FSR02 HMI The main switch shall be secured against accidental switch-on D SG01 SG04
SG05 SG17
FSR03 Steering The controller shall request a brake to standstill on missing operating mode status messages B SG01
FSR04 Control Logic The controller shall send operating mode status periodically B SG01 SG02
FSR05 Steering The controller shall request a brake to standstill on detecting discrepancies in the operating mode over
a period greater than the tolerance specified while monitoring the state machine of the vehicle guidance
system
B SG01 SG02
FSR06 Brake The system shall bring the vehicle to standstill on requests of other controllers D SG01 SG02
SG03 SG12
FSR13 Steering The force applied to the steering wheel shall be limited to allow driver override D SG17
FSR14 Steering The system shall limit steering angle and steering angle gradient feasible D SG03
FSR15 Steering The controller shall request a brake to standstill on receiving a steering request outside of the valid range D SG03
FSR16 Steering The system shall realize steering requests within the valid range D SG03
FSR19 Brake The system shall not perform brake actuation on false requests of other controllers in Manual Mode C SG04
FSR23 Brake The system shall bring the vehicle to standstill on detection of internal faults QM SG04
FSR24 Brake The controller shall notify other controllers of internal faults detected QM SG04
FSR25 Control Logic The system shall perform a mode change into Safe Halt on notifications of faults of the Brake QM SG04
FSR29 Brake The system shall contain a safety monitor to ensure changing into Manual Mode on driver intervention QM SG06
FSR30 Steering The system shall detect human intervention on the steering wheel and communicate intervention to other
controllers
QM SG06
FSR31 Brake The system shall detect human intervention on the brake pedal and communicate intervention to other
controllers
QM SG06
FSR32 Drive The system shall detect human intervention on the accelerator pedal and communicate intervention to
other controllers
QM SG06
FSR34 HMI The controller shall acknowledge receipt of messages of the Control Logic B SG07
FSR35 HMI The system shall display error states B SG07
FSR36 HMI The system shall read out the operating mode indicator and perform a plausibility check on target and
indicated values
B SG07
FSR37 Radio The link shall support an end-to-end protection mechanism and include an alive-counter B SG07
FSR38 Control Logic The controller shall acknowledge receipt of messages of the HMI B SG07
FSR39 Control Logic The system shall remain in Coupled Mode on detecting faults in sending operating mode status B SG07
FSR40 Control Logic The system shall perform a mode change into Safe Halt on detecting faults in sending operating mode
status in Follow Mode
B SG07
FSR42 Brake The system shall hold the vehicle at standstill in Safe Halt mode B SG08
FSR43 Control Logic The controller shall continuously send the Safe Halt condition to the Brake B SG08
FSR45 Control Logic The controller shall communicate the operating mode change into Safe Halt to the Brake B SG09
FSR46 Brake The system shall bring the vehicle to standstill on mode change into Safe Halt B SG09
FSR47 Environment
Perception
The system shall determine the lateral and longitudinal distance of the leading vehicle with sufficient
precision and communicate the result to other controllers
QM SG10
FSR48 Control Logic The system shall perform a mode change into Safe Halt on one or both distance values of the leading
vehicle exceeding their tolerance band
QM SG10
FSR49 Brake The system shall determine the vehicle speed with sufficient precision B SG11
FSR50 Brake The system shall bring the vehicle to standstill on detection of vehicle speed exceeding the limit specified B SG11





The system shall determine the relative distance of the vehicle to the left lane marking and communicate
the result to other controllers
B SG12





The system shall detect relevant obstacles and communicate their relative position to other controllers QM SG13
FSR59 Human
Operator





The controller shall notify other controllers of a missing leading vehicle QM SG14 SG15
FSR61 Control Logic The system shall perform a mode change into Safe Halt on notifications of a missing leading vehicle QM SG14 SG15
FSR62 Brake The system shall ensure anti-lock functionality according to the specifications D SG16
FSR63 Steering The controller shall request a brake to standstill if plausibility checks on target and actual values to
monitor control accuracy find discrepancies beyond the tolerance specified
D SG03
FSR64 Steering The controller shall send status messages including an alive-counter periodically to the Brake D SG03
FSR65 Brake The system shall bring the vehicle to standstill on false or missing status messages of the Steering D SG03
FSR66 Human
Operator
Operating instructions shall state that an obstacle has to be removed before starting automated operation QM SG13
FSR67 Control Logic The controller shall communicate the operating mode change into Manual Mode to the Brake C SG04
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